Merkle v. Upper Dublin Schl. Dist. by unknown
2000 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-9-2000 
Merkle v. Upper Dublin Schl. Dist. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000 
Recommended Citation 
"Merkle v. Upper Dublin Schl. Dist." (2000). 2000 Decisions. 93. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000/93 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2000 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed May 9, 2000 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 99-1613 
 
LOU ANN MERKLE 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UPPER DUBLIN SCHOOL DISTRICT; 
UPPER DUBLIN TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT; 
MARGARET THOMAS; CLAIR BROWN, JR., DR.; 
JACK HAHN, DETECTIVE 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
D.C. No.: 98-cv-03703 
District Judge: Honorable Robert F. Kelly 
 
Argued: January 24, 2000 
 
Before: GREENBERG, ROTH, and ROSENN, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 9, 2000) 
 
       A. Martin Herring (Argued) 
       A. Martin Herring & Associates 
       1845 Walnut Street, Suite 2240 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103 
        Counsel for Appellant 
 
 
  
       Jeffrey H. Quinn (Argued) 
       Duffy & Quinn 
       Independence Square West 
       The Curtis Center, Suite 1150 
       Philadelphia, PA 19106 
        Counsel for Appellees 
       Upper Dublin School, Margaret 
       Thomas, and Clair Brown 
 
       L. Rostaing Tharaud (Argued) 
       Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, 
        Coleman & Goggin 
       1845 Walnut Street 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103 
        Counsel for Appellees 
       Upper Dublin Twp. Police and 
       Jack Hahn 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal presents several interesting questions arising 
out of an alleged constitutional tort committed by a 
township school district and its superintendent in the 
arrest and prosecution of one of their teachers for the 
unlawful removal of school supplies. The plaintiff, Lou Ann 
Merkle, formerly a teacher at the Upper Dublin School 
District ("the District"), filed this action in the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under 42 
U.S.C. S 1983. She alleged violations of her rights under the 
First, Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well 
as pendent state law claims for defamation, invasion of 
privacy, false arrest and malicious prosecution. The 
defendants are the District, District Superintendent Dr. 
Clair Brown, Jr., and Sandy Run Middle School Principal 
Margaret Thomas (collectively, "the School Defendants"); 
and the Upper Dublin Police Department and Upper Dublin 
Police Detective Jack Hahn (collectively, "the Police 
Defendants"). 
 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
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all defendants as to Merkle's federal law claims. The court 
held that Merkle had failed to offer sufficient evidence to 
establish a genuine issue of material fact as to these 
claims, and also that Superintendent Brown, Principal 
Thomas, and Detective Hahn were entitled to qualified 
immunity. Having entered judgment for all defendants on 
these federal claims, the district court refused to exercise 
jurisdiction over Merkle's state law claims, and accordingly 
dismissed those claims without prejudice. Merkle timely 
appealed.1 We affirm the judgment of the district court as 
it relates to the Police Defendants and the principal, 
Margaret Thomas, but reverse as it applies to the School 
District and its superintendent, Dr. Clair Brown. 
 
I. 
 
Background 
 
Merkle taught art at Sandy Run Middle School in the 
Upper Dublin School District of Pennsylvania. She had 
been a proponent of raising multicultural awareness in the 
District, and at times had been outspoken about her views. 
She was a leader in a local chapter of a group known as 
Seeking Educational Equity and Diversity, or SEED, which 
she had helped to bring to the school district with the 
approval of Superintendent Clair Brown. In addition, at a 
May 1996 public meeting of the District's Board of School 
Directors, Merkle spoke in support of a parent's request 
that The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn be removed from 
the District's required reading list because of its offensive 
language with respect to African Americans. Sometime 
thereafter, Superintendent Brown acceded to this request. 
 
Margaret Thomas took over as principal of Sandy Run 
prior to the start of the 1996-97 school year. Merkle 
testified in her deposition in this case that shortly after 
Thomas assumed the principal post, she mentioned to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court had jurisdiction over Merkle's federal law claims 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 1343(a)(3), and over her state law 
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1367(a). This court has appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
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Merkle that she had attended the May 1996 board meeting, 
and that she felt it was a "mistake" for Merkle to publicly 
challenge a District policy at that meeting. 
 
On August 27, 1997, prior to the start of the 1997-98 
school year, Merkle and fellow art teacher Nancy 
 
Markowich were cleaning out the art supplies closet at the 
Sandy Run Middle School. They apparently decided that 
some of the items in the supply closet were no longer useful 
and could be donated to the North Hills Community Center, 
a local center serving underprivileged children. These items 
included two cartons containing a total of 144 unopened 
boxes of Crayola Crayons.2 At this time, Merkle was 
unaware of any official school procedures for obtaining 
permission to donate art supplies, and apparently believed 
that such decisions were within the art teacher's discretion. 
The next day, Merkle brought these items to her car, which 
was parked outside the school. Margaret Thomas and 
Sandy Run Assistant Principal Wanda Anderson saw 
Merkle loading these boxes of supplies into her car, and 
Thomas approached Merkle and asked what she was doing. 
Merkle explained that Mrs. Markowich and she concluded 
that these materials "weren't useful in the curriculum," and 
that they intended to donate them to the North Hills 
Community Center. Thomas asked if Merkle had 
authorization to donate these materials. Merkle responded 
that she did not, and asked what Thomas suggested. 
Thomas replied that she did not know but that she would 
call the District's business manager to ascertain if there 
was a procedure for donations of school property. Thomas 
directed Merkle that in the meantime she should bring the 
art materials back inside the school. Merkle promptly 
complied. 
 
When Thomas called the business manager, he informed 
her that a list of the items sought to be donated must be 
compiled and submitted to the school board for approval. 
Thomas also spoke with Superintendent Brown who, after 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The total cost of the supplies in question is in dispute. The District 
contends the supplies have a approximate value between $250 and 
$400. Merkle claims, however, that the supplies are worth no more than 
$24. 
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consulting the District's attorney, instructed Thomas to call 
the Upper Dublin Police Department to report the incident. 
Apparently Brown, however, personally called the Chief of 
Police to tell him that Thomas would be calling to report a 
teacher whom she had witnessed taking District property 
without permission, and who had admitted that she had 
done this in the past as well. Thomas informed Merkle that 
Brown had instructed her to call the police, and Thomas 
carried out Brown's instruction. 
 
The Police Department assigned Detective Hahn to the 
case. Hahn met with Thomas at Sandy Run Middle School 
on August 29, the day after the incident. Thomas told Hahn 
about the incident, and according to Hahn, explained that 
the District wanted "charges filed" against Merkle. Based 
solely on the information he learned from Thomas, Hahn 
swore out an affidavit of probable cause for Merkle's arrest, 
as well as a criminal complaint against her. In Hahn's 
affidavit of probable cause, he averred that Thomas 
informed him that Merkle admitted to "stealing the supplies 
from the school." Hahn testified in his deposition that 
Thomas actually used the word "stealing" during their 
meeting, that this was the basis for his determination that 
probable cause for arrest did exist, and that he did not take 
any written statement from her. In Thomas's deposition in 
this case, however, she testified that she did not tell Hahn 
that Merkle had confessed to "stealing," but rather that 
Merkle had acknowledged that she knew the art materials 
were District property, and that she had not asked for or 
received permission to take these materials from the school. 
Nevertheless, Detective Hahn also testified that"taking 
another's property without permission" meant the same 
thing to him as "stealing." 
 
That same day, a meeting took place between Merkle, 
Superintendent Brown, Principal Thomas, and the District's 
director of personnel. Merkle was represented at this 
meeting by individuals from her teacher's union. At this 
meeting, Merkle was informed that she would be suspended 
from her teaching position without pay pending the 
outcome of an investigation. 
 
On September 2, Hahn arrested Merkle and charged her 
with theft by taking pursuant to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  
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S 3921.3 The police criminal complaint also charged her 
with receipt of stolen property pursuant to 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann.  S 3925,4 and criminal attempt pursuant to 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  S 901.5  After her arrest, the School 
District suspended Merkle from her position, and 
Superintendent Brown wrote a letter to the school board 
recommending that Merkle be dismissed on the ground of 
"immorality." 
 
District Justice Patricia Zaffarano held a preliminary 
hearing on October 6, 1997, and bound Merkle over for 
trial. Thereafter, the incident received considerable 
attention in the local newspaper. The District issued a 
public statement explaining that Merkle was observed 
taking art supplies from Sandy Run, that Detective Hahn 
had filed a criminal complaint charging Merkle with theft, 
receiving stolen property, and criminal attempt to commit 
theft, that a district justice had found that a prima facie 
case existed on these charges, and that a trial date was 
going to be set. The District refused to make additional 
comment on the matter, except to say that the district 
attorney would contact the newspaper when he deemed 
appropriate. 
 
Merkle filed a motion for habeas corpus in the Court of 
Common Pleas for Montgomery County, and on January 
16, 1998, her motion was granted and the charges against 
her dismissed. Merkle pursued administrative remedies 
regarding her employment status, and after 91 days of 
suspension and arbitration under the collective bargaining 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. This provision states that "[a] person is guilty of theft if he 
unlawfully 
takes, or exercises unlawful control over, movable property of another 
with intent to deprive him thereof." 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 3921(a). 
 
4. This provision states that "[a] person is guilty of theft if he 
intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of 
another 
knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been 
stolen, unless the property is received, retained, or disposed with intent 
to restore it to the owner." 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 3925(a). 
 
5. This provision states that "[a] person commits an attempt when, with 
intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a 
substantial step toward the commission of that crime." 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. S 901(a). 
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agreement, she won reinstatement with back pay. Merkle 
has since left her position at the District. 
 
Merkle's complaint in the instant action raised numerous 
federal claims. Against the Police Defendants, she claims 
violation of her Fourth Amendment rights by arresting her 
without probable cause, and, with respect to the Police 
Department, by failing to train its detectives so as to 
prevent her arrest without probable cause. Against the 
School Defendants, she claims (1) violation of her First 
Amendment rights by retaliating against her for her 
outspokenness on the issue of multicultural awareness, (2) 
violation of her Sixth Amendment rights by instituting a 
malicious prosecution against her, and (3) violation of her 
Fourteenth Amendment rights by defaming her, thereby 
infringing on her liberty interest in her good name, 
reputation, honor and integrity.6 She also raises a number 
of state law claims against all defendants. 
 
II. 
 
Discussion 
 
This court's review of the district court's order granting 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants is plenary. 
See Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 170 (3d Cir. 1998), 
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 797 (2000). Summary judgment 
may be granted where there exists no genuine issue as to 
any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In 
addressing a motion for summary judgment, the facts must 
be viewed in the light most favorable to Merkle, and she is 
entitled to every reasonable inference that can be drawn 
from the record. See Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 
(3d Cir. 1997). We first discuss Merkle's claims against the 
Police Defendants, and then her claim against the School 
Defendants. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Although Merkle's complaint alleges her constitutional claims and a 
section 1983 claim separately, the district court correctly interpreted 
all 
of the constitutional claims as various bases supporting a claim arising 
under section 1983. 
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A. 
 
The Police Defendants 
 
1. 
 
Detective Hahn 
 
On the appeal to this court, Merkle contends that the 
district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor 
of the Police Defendants on her Fourth Amendment claim 
that Detective Hahn arrested her without probable cause. 
"Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and 
circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are 
sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to 
believe that an offense has been or is being committed by 
the person to be arrested." Orsatti v. New Jersey State 
Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995). Generally, "the 
question of probable cause in a section 1983 damage suit 
is one for the jury." Montgomery v. De Simone , 159 F.3d 
120, 124 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 
F.3d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997); Deary v. Three Un-Named 
Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185, 190-92 (3d Cir. 1984). This is 
particularly true where the probable cause determination 
rests on credibility conflicts. See Sharrar , 128 F.3d at 818; 
Deary, 746 F.2d at 192. However, a district court may 
conclude "that probable cause exists as a matter of law if 
the evidence, viewed most favorably to Plaintiff, reasonably 
would not support a contrary factual finding," and may 
enter summary judgment accordingly. Sherwood v. 
Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
In Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d, 810, 817-18 (3d Cir. 
1992) this court reiterated the well-established rule that 
probable cause is defined in terms and circumstances 
sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the 
suspect had committed or was committing a crime. Id. It is 
the function of this court to determine whether the 
objective facts available to Detective Hahn at the time he 
arrested Merkle were sufficient to justify a reasonable belief 
that she had committed a theft. See id. at 818; United 
States v. Glasser, 750 F.2d 1197, 1206 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. 
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denied, 471 U.S. 1018 (1985). In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213 (1983), the Court adopted a "totality of the 
circumstances" approach in assessing the existence of 
probable cause to issue a search warrant and "identified a 
`common sense' aspect to the issue of probable cause." 
(Quoted in Glasser, 750 F.2d at 1201.) Moreover, since this 
appeal comes to us from an order granting summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants, the facts must be 
considered in the light most favorable to Merkle. See Gallo 
v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
We, therefore, examine the evidence produced by Merkle 
to determine whether she has raised a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Detective Hahn had probable 
cause to arrest her. Moreover, the common law 
presumption raised by a magistrate's prior finding that 
probable cause exists does not apply to section 1983 
actions. 
 
The issue of whether Detective Hahn had probable cause 
to arrest rests almost entirely on his knowledge of what 
Merkle stated to Thomas when the latter interrupted the 
removal of the supplies. Merkle's version of what occurred 
is corroborated by Thomas. We therefore have a situation 
where Merkle was in the process of removing art teaching 
supplies which she and her colleague, Markowich, 
considered of no use in their curriculum. After having been 
informed of prior unsuccessful efforts to ascertain whether 
other teachers in the school had use for the unopened 
crayons, Merkle decided to turn over the supplies to the 
North Hills Community Center. In loading the supplies into 
her car for that purpose, Merkle assumed that as an art 
teacher, she had the discretion and authority to do this. 
 
When questioned by Thomas, Merkle promptly and 
candidly informed her that the supplies, in her mind, were 
useless and that she believed she implicitly had the 
authority to dispose of them. When Thomas questioned 
Merkle's authority to do this, Merkle promptly returned the 
supplies to the school building. Thomas did not regard the 
removal as a theft. 
 
If "at the moment the arrest was made . . . the facts and 
circumstances within [the defendant's] knowledge and of 
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which [he] had reasonably trustworthy information were 
sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing" that the 
plaintiff had violated the law, probable cause is present. 
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (quoting Beck 
v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). In challenging Detective 
Hahn's determination that probable cause to arrest existed, 
Merkle has the burden of showing, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that (1) Hahn knowingly and deliberately, or 
with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false 
statements or omissions in his affidavit of probable cause 
that create a falsehood in applying for an arrest warrant; 
and (2) such statements or omissions are material to the 
finding of probable cause. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 
U.S. 145, 171-72 (1978); Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 399. 
 
In his affidavit, Hahn stated that Principal Thomas told 
him that Merkle had admitted to "stealing" the art supplies. 
In his deposition in this case, Hahn testified that had 
Merkle not admitted improper conduct to Thomas, he 
would not have concluded that probable cause existed to 
arrest. As the district court acknowledged, however, there is 
conflicting testimony on the record about the accuracy of 
Hahn's description of Merkle's admission. Although Hahn 
testified that Thomas told him Merkle confessed to 
"stealing," Thomas testified that she merely told him that 
Merkle admitted to taking school property without 
permission. Detective Hahn's testimony on this point is 
somewhat confused. He testified that for his purposes, 
"stealing" meant the same thing to him as taking another's 
property without permission. However, he also testified that 
had Thomas not used the word "stealing," he would not 
have concluded that there existed probable cause to arrest 
Merkle. The district court found that this factual dispute 
was immaterial, holding that "when an individual . . . is 
found loading her car with materials that do not belong to 
her, and reliable witnesses attest to this, a police officer 
who gets the report has probable cause to arrest." (Op. at 
11). Specifically, the court held that these circumstances 
were sufficient to support an arrest for the crime of theft by 
taking, which requires only the taking of property with the 
intent to deprive the owner thereof. (Op. at 12). 7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The district court did not address whether Hahn had probable cause 
to arrest Merkle for the other crime with which she was charged, receipt 
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Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Merkle, 
this court must assume that Thomas told Hahn merely that 
Merkle admitted that she had no permission to take the 
property she was found loading into her car. The question 
therefore becomes whether a reasonable person in Hahn's 
position could have concluded, based on this knowledge, 
that Merkle had committed a crime. Merkle argues that the 
district court's reasoning is flawed because the mere report 
of a witness that an individual was seen loading her car 
with materials that did not belong to her does not establish 
probable cause in all cases. For example, a teacher might 
be taking home materials belonging to the school to prepare 
class lessons. This, Merkle, contends, does not evidence an 
intent to deprive the District of its property. However, 
Thomas also told Hahn of Merkle's announced intention to 
give the property to the North Hills Community Center. 
Thus, Hahn possessed knowledge of a credible report from 
a credible eyewitness that Merkle did intend to deprive the 
District of its property. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could 
not find that Hahn lacked knowledge of sufficient facts to 
establish probable cause to arrest Merkle for the crime of 
theft by taking.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
of stolen property. Arguably, probable cause to arrest Merkle for this 
crime did not exist. This crime requires that the defendant must have 
known or believed the property at issue was "stolen." See supra note 3. 
There was no indication that Merkle viewed the art supplies in this 
manner. Rather, she appears to have genuinely believed that she had 
discretion to donate the property. Regardless, if Merkle's arrest on the 
charge of theft by taking was proper, we will not invalidate it merely 
because she was also improperly charged with the additional crime. 
Although a different conclusion may be warranted if the additional 
charge results in longer detention, higher bail, or some other added 
disability, there is no evidence in this record that the charge of receipt 
of stolen property had such effect. 
8. Merkle also contends that Hahn lacked probable cause because he 
failed to interview other witnesses, such as Vice Principal Anderson, art 
teacher Markowich, or Merkle herself, prior to making the arrest. 
However, Hahn had every reason to believe a credible report from a 
school principal who witnessed the alleged crime. This report alone 
sufficiently established probable cause. Hahn was not required to 
undertake an exhaustive investigation in order to validate the probable 
cause that, in his mind, already existed. See Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 
Inc., 797 F.2d 432, 439 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1028 
(1987); Morrison v. United States, 491 F.2d 344, 346 (8th Cir. 1974). 
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2. 
 
The Police Department 
 
In her complaint, Merkle also charged the Upper Dublin 
Township Police Department with violating her Fourth 
Amendment rights. Under section 1983, municipal liability 
arises only when a constitutional deprivation results from 
official custom or policy. See Monell v. Department of Social 
Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); 
Montgomery, 159 F.3d at 126-27 (citing City of Canton, Ohio 
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). Merkle makes no 
argument on appeal regarding her claim that the Upper 
Dublin Police Department violated her Fourth Amendment 
rights by failing to properly train Detective Hahn. It appears 
that Merkle has waived this claim, and therefore, this court 
need not address it. See Warren G. v. Cumberland County 
Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 84 (3d Cir. 1999) (issue waived if 
not raised in party's opening brief). 
 
B. 
 
The School Defendants 
 
Merkle also claims that the School Defendants (1) 
maliciously prosecuted her in violation of the her Sixth 
Amendment rights, (2) retaliated against her for her 
outspoken support of multiculturalism in violation of her 
First Amendment rights, and (3) caused harm to her 
reputation in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment 
rights. 
 
Merkle contends that the School Defendants violated her 
constitutional rights by initiating and pursuing her 
prosecution even though Superintendent Brown and 
Principal Thomas knew that she had committed no crime.9 
Although the charges against Merkle were filed and the 
actual prosecution conducted by Detective Hahn, 10 both 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Based on Merkle's complaint, her claims against the District appear to 
be based on the acts of Superintendent Brown as the District's 
policymaking official. 
10. Apparently, in cases of this type, the investigating detective often 
represents the Commonwealth at the preliminary hearing. Consequently, 
Detective Hahn acted as the prosecutor at Merkle's preliminary hearing. 
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Hahn and the Chief of Police testified that the police 
department would not have pressed charges and pursued 
the criminal prosecution unless (1) the victim requested it 
and (2) it believed it had probable cause to do so. The Chief 
of Police further testified that once charges werefiled, those 
charges would not be withdrawn unless the victim so 
requested. It is undisputed that in his initial telephone call 
to the Chief of Police, Superintendent Brown said he 
wanted criminal charges filed against Merkle if sufficient 
evidence existed. In her initial meeting with Detective Hahn, 
Thomas informed him that Superintendent Brown wanted 
to press charges against Merkle. Prior to the preliminary 
hearing, Hahn asked Superintendent Brown if he still 
wanted to go through with the prosecution, and Dr. Brown 
replied that he did. Therefore, the School Defendants, not 
just the Police Defendants, are responsible for Merkle's 
prosecution. 
 
The district court analyzed Merkle's S 1983 malicious 
prosecution claim based on the elements of the common 
law tort of malicious prosecution. In Pennsylvania, a 
plaintiff alleging common law malicious prosecution must 
show (1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) 
the criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff 's favor; (3) 
the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; and 
(4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other 
than bringing the plaintiff to justice. See Hilfirty v. 
Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 579 (3d Cir. 1996). The court held 
that Merkle's claim failed on the third element, relying on 
its holding that Detective Hahn had probable cause to 
arrest Merkle. 
 
Although the parties do not so contend, the district 
court's analysis appears not to have been abreast of recent 
developments in the law. It was at one time the law of this 
circuit that a plaintiff alleging a section 1983 claim for 
malicious prosecution would be required only to show the 
elements of the common law tort. See Lee v. Mihalich, 847 
F.2d 66, 69-70 (3d Cir. 1988). However, in the aftermath of 
the Supreme Court's decision in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 
266 (1994), this court has acknowledged that this is no 
longer the case. In Albright, the Court held that a claim of 
malicious prosecution under section 1983 cannot be based 
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on substantive due process considerations, but instead 
must be based on a provision of the Bill of Rights providing 
"an explicit textual source of constitutional protection." Id. 
at 272 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
This court has since noted that Albright"casts doubt" on 
prior circuit precedent adopting common law malicious 
prosecution as the test in a S1983 action. Gallo v. City of 
Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 1998). The court 
in Gallo analyzed whether a malicious prosecution claim 
arose from the Fourth Amendment, i.e., whether the 
prosecution worked a post-indictment "seizure" on the 
S 1983 plaintiff. The court concluded that the malicious 
prosecution at issue did work a post-indictment seizure 
where the plaintiff 's liberty "was constrained in multiple 
ways for an extended period of time." Id. at 225. 
Specifically, the plaintiff was subjected to travel restrictions 
and was compelled to attend a number of court hearings 
over an eight-and-a-half month period. Id. Accordingly, the 
Gallo court reversed the district court's grant of summary 
judgment for the defendants, and remanded for further 
proceedings. 
 
We have expanded on the altered nature of the post- 
Albright malicious prosecution landscape in Torres v. 
McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 1998). The Torres court 
read Albright as standing for the proposition that a section 
1983 malicious prosecution claim could be based on a 
constitutional provision other than the Fourth Amendment, 
including the procedural component of the Due Process 
Clause, so long as it was not based on substantive due 
process. Id. at 173.11 
 
Merkle predicates her constitutional malicious 
prosecution claim on the First and Sixth Amendments. We 
turn to her Sixth Amendment claim first because it requires 
only a minimum of discussion. It is difficult to understand 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. This court did not immediately recognize that Albright changed the 
manner in which S 1983 malicious prosecution claims must be analyzed. 
For example, in Hilfirty v. Shipman, decided two-and-a-half years after 
Albright, we continued to adhere to the pre-Albright common law analysis 
of malicious prosecution claims brought under S 1983. See 91 F.3d at 
579. 
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how the Sixth Amendment is implicated here. That 
amendment affords individuals rights to a speedy trial, to 
an impartial jury, to know the nature and cause of a 
criminal accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses 
against them, and to effective assistance of counsel. Merkle 
makes no effort to relate her claim to the rights afforded by 
the Sixth Amendment. She does, however, explain that she 
was deprived of liberty by reason of the prosecution, 
because she was compelled "to attend court hearings and 
her job [was] placed in jeopardy as a result of being charged 
with a crime of moral turpitude." (Appellant's Br. at 25 n.9). 
The latter argument -- that her job was placed in jeopardy 
because she was charged with a crime of moral turpitude -- 
seems akin to a substantive due process argument. Indeed, 
no constitutional provision other than the substantive 
component of the Due Process Clause even arguably affords 
the protection Merkle asserts. As noted above, however, the 
Supreme Court held in Albright that a violation of 
substantive due process is no basis for a malicious 
prosecution claim brought pursuant to section 1983. 
 
Merkle's former argument -- that she was compelled to 
attend court hearings by reason of the false prosecution -- 
seems like a Fourth Amendment seizure argument similar 
to the argument considered by this court in Gallo. Merkle 
has failed to assert the Fourth Amendment as the basis for 
her claim against the School Defendants, however, even 
though this court gave her the opportunity to do so at oral 
argument. We therefore do not address this argument. 
 
Merkle next claims that the School Defendants instituted 
a criminal prosecution against her and suspended her from 
her teaching position to retaliate for her outspoken 
statements in support of multicultural awareness. Merkle's 
retaliation claim is analyzed under a three step, burden- 
shifting methodology. First, Merkle must demonstrate that 
her speech was protected. For purposes of this appeal, the 
parties concede that it was. Second, Merkle must show that 
her speech was a motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory 
action. Third, the School Defendants may defeat Merkle's 
claim by establishing that it would have taken the same 
adverse action against Merkle even in the absence of her 
protected speech. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
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Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); Latessa v. New 
Jersey Racing Comm'n, 113 F.3d 1313, 1319 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
The district court granted summary judgment for the 
School Defendants on the retaliation claim. The court found 
that the School Defendants would have suspended Merkle 
from her teaching position, even absent her speech, based 
on their discovery that she was putting school supplies into 
her car for which she was arrested. Merkle correctly points 
out that the district court defined the alleged retaliatory 
action too narrowly, focusing only on the District's decision 
to suspend Merkle. Merkle's claim of retaliation is directed 
at the whole course of conduct by the School Defendants in 
persisting to press criminal charges against her instead of 
handling the matter administratively. 
 
That course of conduct grew out of a conversation 
between Thomas and Merkle when Thomas saw Merkle 
carrying openly and in daylight a carton of school supplies 
to her car. It is, however, the conduct which occurred after 
this that is significant: Superintendent Brown's telephone 
call to his friend, the Chief of Police, in which, despite 
Brown's knowledge that Merkle intended to donate the 
supplies to the North Hills Community Center, Brown 
expressed his desire for an investigation and prosecution; 
Brown's persistence despite the Chief 's query"are you sure 
you want to do this?"; the failure of the District to consider 
taking administrative action, rather than instituting 
criminal prosecution, against Merkle for what the police 
considered to be an internal school district matter, 
particularly in view of the lack of a school district policy on 
the disposal of surplus supplies; Brown's affirmation to 
Hahn before the preliminary hearing that Brown still 
wanted to prosecute Merkle; and Brown's recommendation 
to the school board that Merkle be dismissed on the ground 
of "immorality." 
 
Additional conduct which we find significant is the 
statement Brown made to the press, after consulting with 
the District's solicitor, apparently in response to the events 
at a school board meeting at which approximately two 
hundred community residents protested Merkle's 
suspension and prosecution. The press release denied that 
the crayons could not be used by the District. It explained 
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that the school administration could not comment at the 
meeting on the action it had taken because, the District 
Justice having found a prima facie case on charges of theft, 
receipt of stolen property and criminal attempt at theft, "it 
is fundamental and basic to fairness and legal ethics that 
no comment by the parties be made in a criminal 
proceeding until the matter is adjudicated." The statement, 
however, gave no information on Merkle's version of the 
incident. 
 
Brown claims to have acted out of concern that this 
incident was part of a pattern of unauthorized disposition 
of District property to the North Hills Community Center 
and elsewhere. Indeed, Thomas did report to Brown that 
the two cartons of crayons she found Merkle loading into 
her car were unopened.12 Under these circumstances, 
however, whether Brown acted out of a concern that 
valuable supplies were being stolen or whether he 
criminally prosecuted Merkle and terminated her contract 
with the District in retaliation for her activities in promoting 
multicultural awareness is a disputed question of fact for a 
jury and not a question of law for the trial court. 
 
Merkle charges that the District embarked on its course 
of malicious prosecution because of her activities with 
SEED, which were protected, inter alia, by the First 
Amendment. Merkle played a leadership role in SEED and 
was a member of its academic and cultural sensitivity task 
force. SEED provided books and films to teachers to train 
them on diversity issues before problems arose in the 
classroom. It was through SEED that the protest was made 
to the school board of having "Huckleberry Finn" as 
required reading. After Merkle stated at a school board 
meeting that "Huckleberry Finn" should be"pulled," 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Merkle was under the impression that the crayons were the result of 
"a gross over-order" about eight years before. She testified that over a 
course of years, Nancy Markowich put announcements in the daily 
bulletin that goes out to all teachers in the Sandy Run School offering 
the crayons, but no one requested them. In addition to the crayons, 
there was some dry powder paint, a jar or two of old tempera paint, and 
some dry glue. The cart with usable general supplies was rolled into the 
general supply closet for retention. 
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Thomas told Merkle that "when your school had a policy, as 
a teacher it's a mistake to speak out against it publicly." 
 
Our review of this entire course of events convinces us 
that Merkle has not produced evidence that Thomas's 
actions, including her report to the superintendent of the 
removal of supplies, amounted to retaliatory action against 
Merkle. For that reason, we will affirm the district court's 
order granting summary judgment for Margaret Thomas. 
We differ with the district court, however, with respect to 
Merkle's claims against the Upper Dublin School District 
and its superintendent, Dr. Clair Brown. We believe that 
whether these defendants' actions against Merkle were 
retaliatory is, for purposes of summary judgment, 
influenced by the strength of Merkle's claim against them 
for common law malicious prosecution. 
 
We begin our analysis as to the District and Brown with 
the threshold question of whether the presence of probable 
cause for Detective Hahn to make the arrest also imputes 
probable cause in behalf of the School Defendants to the 
criminal prosecution. The action of the School District in 
initiating the criminal proceedings and pressing unfounded 
criminal charges against Merkle can render the District 
liable for its major role in a malicious prosecution. 
Although the police may have acted on the reasonable belief 
that they had probable cause to arrest Merkle, whether the 
School Defendants had probable cause to pursue Merkle's 
prosecution is an independent inquiry, the outcome of 
which is not dictated by our holding that Hahn had 
probable cause to arrest Merkle. Hahn acted only on what 
Principal Thomas told him. As instigators of the arrest, 
however, it is possible that the District and Brown were in 
possession of additional information, not provided to 
Detective Hahn, that would negate any probable cause they 
may otherwise have had to prosecute Merkle. Thus, in 
analyzing the common law claim of malicious prosecution, 
we must consider the facts known to the District and its 
superintendent to determine whether they had probable 
cause to prosecute. See Simmons v. Poltrone, No. Civ. A. 96- 
8659, 1997 WL 805093, at *8 n.6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 1997); 
Doby v. Decrescenzo, No. Civ. A. 94-3991, 1996 WL 
510095, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1996); Hess v. County of 
Lancaster, 514 A.2d 681, 683-84 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986). 
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On the basis of the facts as outlined above, see supra at 
17, we conclude that a jury could find that Brown, and 
through him the School District, acted maliciously in 
pressing unfounded criminal charges against Merkle and 
could reasonably infer that Merkle's protected speech was 
a motivating factor in this course of action. Where a 
reasonable inference can be drawn that an employee's 
speech was at least one factor considered by an employer in 
deciding whether to take action against the employee, the 
question of whether the speech was a motivating factor in 
that determination is best left to the jury. See Watters v. 
City of Philadelphia, 55 F.3d 886, 891 n.3 (3d Cir. 1995); 
Johnson v. Lincoln Univ. of Commonwealth System of Higher 
Educ., 776 F.2d 443, 454 (3d Cir. 1985); Clemens v. 
Dougherty County, Georgia, 684 F.2d 1365, 1368-71 (11th 
Cir. 1982). 
 
We believe the evidence of Merkle's successful challenge 
to the School District's inclusion of "Huckleberry Finn" in 
the school's curriculum at an open meeting and her 
outspokenness about the need for greater cultural 
sensitivity in the District is sufficient on the facts presented 
to raise such questions of fact. When this arguably 
disfavored protected speech is coupled with (1) Brown's 
determination to pursue a criminal prosecution even 
though the objective evidence and police comments 
indicated that the matter should be pursued 
administratively, and (2) his deliberate recommendation 
that Merkle be permanently discharged for "immorality" as 
opposed to simply pursuing administrative alternatives 
such as "verbal counseling at the time of the incident or at 
most a written warning" (which the arbitrator later found 
would have been an appropriate, proportional response), 
room for the inference of discriminatory animus expands 
considerably. 
 
An arrest is a serious matter, especially an arrest of a 
public school teacher whose professional career 
instantaneously is put in jeopardy by stigmatic public 
charges. The arrest humiliates the teacher before her 
pupils, her teaching colleagues and the public. To arrest a 
teacher on the "scanty grounds" adduced here, Albright v. 
Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 1992), especially when 
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there were other less oppressive options, is shocking. The 
supplies, even under the District's estimate of their value, 
were not of sufficient moment to warrant such drastic and 
irreparable action. If, in their disposition, Merkle exceeded 
her discretionary authority or even violated her presumptive 
authority,13 there were reasonable alternatives by which the 
District could exercise control and discipline and give each 
teacher appropriate notice of school policy for disposing of 
useless or surplus supplies. Under these circumstances, 
and especially in the face of doubts on the part of the police 
officers, a jury could reasonably find that the 
Superintendent's decision to arrest and his deliberate 
decision to recommend to the School Board that Merkle's 
contract be terminated on the basis of "immorality" was 
motivated by a desire to retaliate against her for her 
protected activities and not by an interest in protecting the 
unauthorized removal of supplies. A jury could reasonably 
find that the underlying motivation for the discharge lay 
embedded in Merkle's temerity to advocate her 
multicultural program to the School District. In any event, 
these were questions of fact for jury determination, not 
questions of law for the court. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Dr. Brown acknowledged that the faculty handbook does not set 
forth any policy concerning the disposal of useless or surplus supplies. 
He testified on deposition that not every single supply item given to a 
teacher requires Board approval, that some "are thrown out or 
discarded." 
 
He further testified: 
 
       Q: So your position is that when an item becomes unusable it 
       should be kept, and then you need board approval for that? 
 
       A: I didn't say that. I said when an item becomes disposable or in 
       the condition to be disposed of, there's an orderly process to be 
       disposed of. 
 
       Q: And some of that is within the teacher's discretion; correct? 
 
       A: It's in the teacher's discretion to recommend the disposal of 
       materials, certainly. 
 
       Q: And even to dispose of them, isn't it? 
 
       A: I guess that's a judgment that a teacher can make, sure. 
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The dissent rests entirely on the conclusion that Merkle 
actually committed the crime of theft when "she unlawfully 
took or exercised control over [the property] with the 
admitted intent to deprive the School District of it." 
Concurrence and Dissent at 26 and 32. This conclusion, it 
believes, is commanded by language in Gottesfeld v. 
Mechanics & Traders Insurance Co., 173 A.2d 763, 766 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1961). Significantly, the Gottesfeld case relied 
upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in 
Thomas v. Kessler, 5 A.2d 187 (Pa. 1939). In Thomas, the 
plaintiff, a beneficiary of a trust which owned shares of a 
newspaper, went to the newspaper's offices and took some 
stationary, believing she had the right to do so by virtue of 
her interest in the trust. She was charged by the 
newspaper's president with larceny, and she in turnfiled a 
malicious prosecution action against the president. The 
Court of Common Pleas entered a compulsory nonsuit in 
the malicious prosecution action, holding that the 
newspaper's president had probable cause to believe the 
plaintiff had committed a theft. On appeal, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and remanded for 
trial. The Supreme Court held: 
 
       When the facts and circumstances . . . are considered, 
       it is obvious that no larceny was committed, that there 
       was no felonious intent in plaintiff 's mind , that she was 
       not stealing the few sheets of paper, and that she took 
       it because she thought, mistakenly perhaps, that she 
       had the right to. 
 
Id. at 188 (emphasis added). The court summarized its 
holding as follows: "It has been repeatedly held that when 
one takes property under a claim of right, even though 
mistaken, larceny is not committed." Id.; accord Penn-Air, 
Inc. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 269 A.2d 19, 22-24 (Pa. 
1970); Commonwealth v. Compel, 344 A.2d 701, 702-03 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1975). See also Commonwealth v. Sleighter, 
433 A.2d 469, 471 (Pa. 1981). 
 
The Thomas case bears a striking resemblance to the 
facts at hand. When Merkle removed the art supplies from 
the supply closet and decided to donate them to the North 
Hills Community Center, she too did so without "felonious 
intent." Indeed, she believed that as an art teacher, she had 
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discretion to discard property she believed to be useless or 
give it to a non-profit institution that might possibly use it. 
In other words, she believed she had the District's implied 
consent to dispose of the property under these 
circumstances and "that she had the right" to do what she 
did. The School Defendants do not dispute this perception 
of Merkle's mental state at the time she removed the art 
supplies. Thus, based on the undisputed facts, Merkle 
cannot be said to have committed the crime of theft by 
taking. 
 
The dissent is concerned that under the majority's view, 
employers will be reluctant to bring criminal proceedings 
against an employee even when the employee is found 
violating the criminal law. Concurrence and Dissent at 
30-32. We believe this fear is groundless. An employer 
incurs no risk of a suit for malicious prosecution when the 
employer has probable cause to believe that its employee 
had committed a criminal violation. Here, however, the 
employer never had cause to find a criminal violation, 
because it knew that Merkle acted without criminal intent. 
The dissent assumes that Merkle committed a criminal 
violation, an assumption that is negated by the facts, the 
circumstances, and the law. 
 
Finally, Merkle claims that as to the School District and 
Dr. Brown, their actions willfully and recklessly caused 
injury to her "good name, reputation, honor and integrity," 
in which she had a liberty interest under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Specifically, she points to (1) Dr. Brown's 
report to the Chief of Police that Merkle had been caught 
loading District property into her car without authorization, 
and noting his concern that this had been going on for 
some time, and (2) the District's statement to the local 
newspaper regarding the Merkle prosecution claimed that 
the art supplies were valuable and usable to the District, 
and described the District as "the party offended against," 
but omitted mention of Merkle's explanation that she 
believed the supplies were useless and unnecessary to the 
curriculum, and that she intended to donate them to the 
North Hills Community Center. (Appellant's Br. at 33-34). 
 
This court has warned against "equat[ing] a state 
defamation claim with a cause of action under section 1983 
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predicated on the Fourteenth Amendment." See Kelly v. 
Borough of Sayreville, 107 F.3d 1073, 1078 (3d Cir. 1997). 
Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect injury to 
reputation alone, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-10 
(1976); Clark v. Township of Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 619 (3d 
Cir. 1989). However, Merkle may show that her Fourteenth 
Amendment rights were violated if the harm to her 
reputation occurred while she was being deprived of 
another constitutional right. See Ersek v. Township of 
Springfield, 102 F.3d 79, 83 n.5 (3d Cir. 1996); Robb v. City 
of Philadelphia, 733 F.2d 286, 294 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 
The district court held that, because it had dismissed all 
of Merkle's other constitutional claims, she could not show 
that any false statements by the District were made in the 
course of another constitutional violation. However, 
because we believe that there is a question of fact for a jury 
as to whether Brown was motivated by Merkle's exercise of 
her First Amendment right of speech to initiate a baseless 
prosecution, she may be able to adduce evidence of an 
injury to her reputation while in the exercise of a 
constitutional right. The truth or falsity of several of the 
allegedly defamatory statements identified by Merkle are 
disputed issues of fact and these too are questions for a 
jury. See Ersek, 102 F.3d at 84 & n.7. In light of our 
determination that it was error for the district court to 
grant the motion of the District and Dr. Brown for 
summary judgment on the First Amendment claim, the 
disposition of Merkle's claim of injury to her reputation will 
also be reversed and remanded. 
 
The district court alternatively held that Superintendent 
Brown was entitled to qualified immunity for his action. 
Government officials performing discretionary functions . . . 
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1992). A defendant 
is entitled to qualified immunity if reasonable officials in 
the defendant's position at the relevant time "could have 
believed, in light of clearly established law, that their 
conduct comported with established legal standards." 
Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 726 
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(3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990). The 
parties do not dispute that the relevant law was clearly 
established at the time of Brown's actions. Thomas, who 
first reported the removal of the supplies, never suggested 
prosecution or that Merkle's conduct amounted to theft. 
Similarly, Coleman, the business manager, considered it a 
matter merely requiring Board approval. 
 
An objective and reasonable assessment under the 
circumstances disclosed at most a mistake in judgment or 
probable exercise of excessive authority, but not a criminal 
intent to steal. The Chief of Police and Detective Hahn both 
raised warning lights for criminal prosecution; Brown, 
however, was determined to arrest and to persist in the 
prosecution. In view of our analysis that Merkle's version of 
the facts supports the proposition that Brown, and through 
him the District, maliciously prosecuted Merkle in 
retaliation for her protected First Amendment activities, it 
follows that Brown is not entitled to qualified immunity. 
Viewed objectively, the act of arrest followed by the refusal 
to withdraw the charges was unreasonable. 
 
III. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Accordingly, the order of the district court granting 
summary judgment to the Police Defendants and to 
Margaret Thomas, the school principal, will be affirmed. 
The order granting summary judgment to the School 
District and its superintendent, Dr. Clair Brown, Jr., and 
alternatively granting Dr. Brown qualified immunity, will be 
reversed and the case remanded for appropriate 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each side to bear 
its own costs. 
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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
 
I concur in and join the majority opinion to the extent 
that it affirms the order of the district court granting 
summary judgment but to the extent that it reverses, I 
dissent. I think that it is perfectly plain that Merkle was the 
only person who did anything wrong in the matters involved 
in this litigation. Under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.S 3921(a) 
(West 1983), "[a] person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully 
takes, or exercises unlawful control over, movable property 
of another with intent to deprive him thereof." It is clear 
that Merkle, without any authority, took 144 unopened 
boxes of Crayola Crayons belonging to the School District 
and was loading them in her car when Thomas interrupted 
her. Indeed, even on this appeal Merkle acknowledges that 
"Prior to this incident, [she] was unaware of any official 
procedure applicable" to the disposal of property. Br. at 5- 
6. Thus, surely she should not have taken the property, as 
she could not take her lack of knowledge of a procedure on 
how to dispose of property to mean that she had a license 
to determine what property was unneeded and to whom the 
district should donate it. 
 
In this regard, I emphasize the following. In Merkle's brief 
she never contends that she asked the School Defendants 
for permission to donate the crayons to the North Hills 
Community Center before she removed them. Rather, she 
only contends that no other teacher at the Sandy Run 
Middle School expressed interest in the crayons. See br. at 
5. Thus, she could not have known whether other schools 
in the district could have made use of the crayons, perhaps 
in a lower grade level than the levels in the middle school 
where she taught. Moreover, when Merkle removed the 
crayons she could not know whether the School District, if 
it determined to dispose of them, would have considered 
the community center as the appropriate donee. Rather, for 
all she knew, the School District would have preferred to 
give away its property to a different recipient. 
 
It is true, of course, that when Thomas interrupted 
Merkle when she was taking the property she returned it to 
the school, and the majority makes much of this conduct. 
But I really do not understand why it does so. After all, 
what else could Merkle have done? What the majority does 
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not consider is that except for the fortuitous circumstance 
that Thomas observed her taking the crayons, the School 
Defendants never might have been aware that she took 
them. Of course, Merkle already had completed the offense 
before she returned the property as she unlawfully took or 
exercised control over it with the admitted intent to deprive 
the School District of it. In the circumstances, there is not 
even a scintilla of doubt but that the School Defendants 
had probable cause as a matter of law to believe that 
Merkle committed a crime when she removed the crayons 
which Merkle could not erase with her after-the-fact 
conduct and explanations. See Gottesfeld v. Mechanics and 
Traders Ins. Co., 173 A.2d 763, 766 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961) 
("Larceny, by definition, is taking or carrying away the 
property of another with intent to convert it to the use of 
someone other than the owner without his consent."). 
 
The majority cites Thomas v. Kessler, 5 A.2d 187, 188 
(Pa. 1939), for the principle that "[i]t has been repeatedly 
held that when one takes property under a claim of right, 
even though mistaken, larceny is not committed." That 
principle, however, is not applicable here as Merkle, unlike 
the plaintiff in Thomas, never has made"a claim of right" 
to the property involved. Quite to the contrary she always 
has acknowledged that the School District was the owner of 
the crayons. She only has claimed that she had the power 
to give away the property. Thus, the facts here, rather than 
bearing "a striking resemblance" to those in Thomas, as the 
majority suggests, maj. op. at 21, plainly are 
distinguishable from those in that case. The same is true of 
the other cases the majority cites as they, too, were 
concerned with the meaning of "claim of right." Therefore 
none of the cases the majority cites can detract from the 
circumstance that the School Defendants had probable 
cause to believe that Merkle was guilty of a theft. 
 
I recognize, of course, that the Court of Common Pleas of 
Montgomery County on Merkle's habeas corpus petition 
found the facts failed to show by the preponderance of the 
evidence that Merkle engaged in criminal activity, and 
suggested that if she was at fault that the matter be 
handled administratively. Nevertheless that finding and 
suggestion cannot change the circumstance that the School 
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Defendants had probable cause to believe that she 
committed a theft. Similarly, the view of the majority that 
the matter should have been handled administratively does 
not change the fact that the School Defendants had 
probable cause to believe a crime had been committed.1 
 
Where, then, are we? Merkle contends that the district 
court "incorrectly determined the issue of probable cause, 
since the facts in dispute created an issue solely reserved 
for jury resolution." Br. at 10. Obviously, the majority 
agrees. But there is no issue of fact for whatever Merkle's 
state of mind, the School Board had probable cause to 
believe that she had committed an offense. I emphasize in 
this regard that Merkle was donating unopened boxes of 
crayons to the community center, items which surely had 
some value for Merkle was not throwing them away. Thus, 
even without regard for the enhanced requirements under 
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S.Ct. 807 (1994), for 
a 42 U.S.C. S 1983 malicious prosecution action, see Gallo 
v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 221-22 (3d Cir. 1998), 
the malicious prosecution aspect of this case should fail.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Considering the rather minor nature of the offense here, I agree that 
an administrative disposition of the matter would have been appropriate. 
But my view no more than that of the Common Pleas Court or majority 
can detract from the fact that the School Defendants had probable cause 
to believe that Merkle had committed a criminal offense. 
 
2. Merkle correctly points out that in Gallo  we indicated that in a 
section 
1983 malicious prosecution action a plaintiff might not be required to 
establish all of the elements of the common law tort of malicious 
prosecution. See Gallo, 161 F.3d at 222 n.6; but see Hilfirty v. Shipman, 
91 F.3d 573, 579 (3d Cir. 1996) ("In order to state a prima facie case for 
a section 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must 
establish the elements of the common law tort as it has developed over 
time."). Nevertheless, inasmuch as the majority includes an analysis of 
whether the School Defendants had probable cause to initiate the 
criminal proceedings and the parties have briefed that issue, I, too, will 
analyze the case on that basis. In any event, I believe that ultimately 
the 
courts will hold that a person will not have committed the constitutional 
tort of malicious prosecution if he had probable cause to initiate the 
criminal proceedings leading to the civil action. On the other hand, 
however, depending on the facts developed, it would be possible to 
sustain a First Amendment retaliation case predicated on the institution 
of criminal proceedings even though the defendant had probable cause 
to initiate the proceedings. 
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Merkle also argues that the School Defendants instituted 
criminal and administrative proceedings against her in 
retaliation for her exercise of her First Amendment rights. 
Under Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568 (1977), where, as here, 
a plaintiff accuses public actors of violating her First 
Amendment rights by retaliating against her by reason of 
First Amendment protected activity, a shifting burden of 
proof analysis is required. First, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that she has engaged in First Amendment 
protected activity. Undoubtedly Merkle did so. Then the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants took an 
adverse action against her. Undoubtedly, Merkle satisfied 
her burden on this point as well for the School Defendants 
gave information to the police that resulted in her criminal 
prosecution and they suspended her as a teacher. 
 
But it is not enough for a plaintiff to show merely that 
she engaged in First Amendment activity and that she 
subsequently suffered an adverse action from the public 
actors who might have taken exception to that activity. 
Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate that her 
constitutionally protected conduct was a "substantial" or 
"motivating factor" in the defendant's conduct. Id. at 287, 
97 S.Ct. at 576. Only if the plaintiff satisfies this initial 
burden does the defendant have the burden to demonstrate 
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have 
taken the same action in the absence of the protected 
conduct. Id.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Our cases indicate that a public employee's claim for a protected 
activity, in this case free speech, should be analyzed in three steps: (1) 
was the activity protected; (2) was the protected activity a substantial 
or 
motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory action; (3) would the 
defendants have taken the same action even in the absence of the 
protected activity. See Fultz v. Dunn, 165 F.3d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1998), 
cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 2342 (1999); Latessa v. New Jersey Racing 
Comm'n, 113 F.3d 1313, 1319 (3d Cir. 1997); Watters v. City of 
Philadelphia, 55 F.3d 886, 892 (3d Cir. 1995). The plaintiff has the 
burden on the first two issues and if the third is reached the defendant 
has the burden on it. I have analyzed the case as including four steps 
as the second step includes two elements: did the defendants take an 
action adverse to the public employee and, if so, was the motivation for 
the action to retaliate against the employee for the protected activity. 
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In fact there is no evidence that Merkle's First 
Amendment activity was a substantial or motivating factor 
in the School Defendants' conduct in notifying the police as 
to what she did or in suspending her. In this regard, I first 
point out that it is significant that Merkle and not the 
School Defendants set the events in motion which led to the 
criminal charges and the suspension. Thus, it was Merkle 
who made the determination to take the crayons. And it 
was Merkle who decided when the crayons would be taken 
and to whom she would give them. 
 
Moreover, there is no direct evidence that Merkle's 
protected activity prior to the crayon incident was a 
substantial or motivating factor in the School Defendants' 
actions leading to her prosecution or suspension. 
Accordingly, unless a court will permit an inference to be 
drawn that an employer's adverse action against an 
employee can be regarded as retaliatory merely because the 
employee has engaged in antagonistic First Amendment 
activity, we must affirm. But by drawing such an inference, 
we effectively will eliminate the plaintiff 's burden under Mt. 
Healthy v. Doyle to demonstrate that the constitutionally 
protected activity was a "substantial" or"motivating factor" 
in the defendants' adverse action. Instead, when an 
employee engages in First Amendment activity and suffers 
an adverse employment action, we immediately will shift to 
the defendants the burden to demonstrate that they would 
have taken adverse action notwithstanding the employee's 
having engaged in First Amendment activity. 
 
I recognize that Merkle sets forth several reasons why she 
thinks that she can demonstrate that the School 
Defendants initiated the criminal proceedings in retaliation 
for her free speech activities, but she merely demonstrates 
that they may have had animosity toward her in part for 
reasons unrelated to her First Amendment activity in issue 
here. Br. at 30-31.4 In a sense, then, her argument is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In her brief Merkle indicates that "[a] jury could give credence to the 
fact that [she] was subject to disparate treatment throughout the school 
year -- subsequent to her speech at the board meeting and continued 
advocacy before the principal." Br. at 31. In support of this contention 
she cites her deposition. See app. at 139-40. There she testified to 
matters completely discrete from the First Amendment activity 
implicated here such as that she was "written up" because of time she 
spent talking with a new student, she left work early, and she did not 
like an "absurd schedule" that the school assigned her. 
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counterproductive. It is critical in considering this point to 
recognize that a section 1983 retaliation case hinges on the 
plaintiff demonstrating that her First Amendment activity 
motivated the employer's adverse action. Thus, for example, 
if an employer's motive in instituting criminal proceedings 
against a teacher was that it thought that she was a poor 
teacher it would not be liable to her in a section 1983 
retaliation case.5 
 
The closest that Merkle comes to demonstrating that she 
was prosecuted by reason of engaging in First Amendment 
activities is her charge "that participating teacher Nancy 
Markowich (who initially suggested the crayon donation) 
was not disciplined nor made subject to criminal 
prosecution -- bolstering the claim of an improper 
motivation." Br. at 31. But her argument here clearly fails 
as Markowich was not involved in the actual removal of the 
property and indeed was not even at the school when 
Merkle removed it. Thus, Merkle cannot establish the nexus 
between the school district taking action adverse to her and 
her First Amendment activity by demonstrating that 
Markowich received disparate and more favorable 
treatment. 
 
I make one final point with respect to the retaliatory 
motivation issue. In Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, the Court said: 
 
       The constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently 
       vindicated if such an employee is placed in no worse a 
       position than if he had not engaged in the conduct. A 
       borderline or marginal candidate should not have the 
       employment question resolved against him because of 
       constitutionally protected conduct. But that same 
       candidate ought not to be able, by engaging in such 
       conduct, to prevent his employer from assessing his 
       performance record and reaching a decision not to 
       rehire on the basis of that record, simply because the 
       protected conduct makes the employer more certain of 
       the correctness of its decision. 
 
429 U.S. at 285-86, 97 S.Ct. at 575. More recently, in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. While it might be liable on some other basis no such issue is raised 
here. 
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recognition of the type of concern expressed in Mt. Healthy 
v. Doyle, we indicated as follows: 
 
        We also make the following observation with respect 
       to performance evaluations. While it is possible that a 
       manager might make a poor evaluation to retaliate 
       against an employee for making an EEOC charge, still 
       it is important that an employer not be dissuaded from 
       making what he believes is an appropriate evaluation 
       by a reason of a fear that the evaluated employee will 
       charge that the evaluation was retaliatory. In this 
       regard, we are well aware that some employees do not 
       recognize their deficiencies and thus erroneously may 
       attribute negative evaluations to an employer's 
       prejudice. Accordingly, in a case like this in which the 
       circumstances simply cannot support an inference that 
       the evaluations were related to the EEOC charges, a 
       court should not hesitate to say so. 
 
Shaner v. Synthes (USA), 204 F.3d 494, 505 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
The concern the Supreme Court expressed in Mt. Healthy 
v. Doyle and that we expressed in Shaner v. Synthes is 
implicated here. Why should the School Defendants have 
been intimidated by the fact that Merkle had engaged in 
First Amendment activities in their response when they 
discovered her illegally removing School District property? 
The lesson that the majority is sending to employers is 
clear: even when you find your employee violating the 
criminal law, be reluctant to bring criminal proceedings 
against her if she has engaged in First Amendment activity, 
lest you be faced with a retaliation claim. Unfortunately, 
the lesson to employees is equally clear: make sure that 
you engage in First Amendment activity in relation to your 
employment in a manner calculated to antagonize the 
supervisory personnel, because if you do so you later will 
be able to charge that any action the employer takes 
adverse to you is in retaliation for that activity. Moreover, 
you should engage in antagonistic First Amendment activity 
for the further reason that if you do so you may anticipate 
that your employer will tolerate misconduct on your part 
that it would not tolerate from employees not similarly 
insulated from disciplinary proceedings. Furthermore, the 
employer will favor you with respect to promotions and the 
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emoluments of your position because if it does not do so 
you may bring retaliation charges against it. 
 
The majority believes that my view that its opinion will 
make employers reluctant to bring criminal proceedings 
when an employee is found violating the law is 
"groundless." Maj. op. at 22. It suggests that the School 
Defendants "never had cause to find a criminal violation, 
because it knew that Merkle acted without criminal intent." 
Id. at 22. Thus, the majority believes that my dissent 
"assumes that Merkle committed a criminal violation," id., 
an assumption that the majority believes "is negated by the 
facts, the circumstances, and the law." Id . 
 
In fact, my position is predicated on the plain 
circumstance that the School Defendants had probable 
cause to believe that Merkle committed a crime and is not 
dependent on whether or not she in fact committed a 
criminal act. There is simply no doubt but that the School 
Defendants had cause to believe that Merkle was exercising 
unlawful control over its property with an intent to deprive 
the School District of the property. Obviously, the mere fact 
that Merkle was not convicted does not mean that the 
School Defendants did not have probable cause to institute 
the criminal proceedings. After all, if the termination of the 
criminal proceedings in favor of the plaintiff, i.e., the 
defendant in the criminal proceedings, meant that the 
criminal proceedings necessarily had been instituted 
without probable cause then there would be no reason for 
the courts to require the plaintiff to prove the absence of 
probable cause in a malicious prosecution action as such 
proof would add nothing to the requirement that the 
criminal proceedings be terminated in the plaintiff 's favor. 
In point of fact the majority opinion will come to have the 
exact chilling effect on employers that I anticipate and 
attorneys representing employers will read the majority 
opinion and advise employers against bringing criminal 
charges even when they have probable cause to do so. 
 
While some people may take umbrage at my suggestion 
as they will say that an honest and conscientious employer 
always will be able to justify its actions, I live in the real 
world and I believe that employers will take action to avoid 
litigation which, after all, at best is expensive and time 
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consuming. In this regard I point out that even a successful 
defendant in a retaliation action probably will not be able to 
recover its legal expenses for its defense. See EEOC v. L.B. 
Foster Co., 123 F.3d 746 (3d Cir. 1997) (Title VII action). 
Moreover, litigation is risky so that even the best 
intentioned employer may seek to avoid a potential 
judgment. 
 
I see no Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest 
implicated here. In her brief Merkle explains that the 
School "District's statement certainly could be read in such 
a manner that would lead a reader to believe that a theft 
had, in fact, occurred." Br. at 34. Her problem with this 
point is that the School Defendants had probable cause to 
believe that such was the case. Moreover, I am unaware of 
anything in the dignified and restrained public statement of 
the School District reprinted in the appendix which was not 
true. See app. at 37-38. In fact, the School District set forth 
the objective facts and then indicated that the police were 
called to investigate, "and as a result of the investigation, 
Detective Jack Hahn filed a criminal complaint charging 
Lou Ann Merkle with theft, receiving stolen property and 
criminal attempt at theft." Thus, it quite escapes me to 
understand how the School Defendants infringed Merkle's 
liberty interest. Indeed, it is a sensational irony that the 
majority in a First Amendment case allows an action 
predicated primarily on the School Defendants' truthful 
statements about a matter of public interest to go forward 
against them. Finally, Dr. Brown has qualified immunity 
because he did not violate any constitutional right of 
Merkle and surely he could have reasonably believed that 
inasmuch as she was engaged in a theft of school property 
she could be prosecuted. See In re City of Philadelphia 
Litig., 49 F.3d 945, 960-61 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
I close with the following comment. While I can 
understand the majority's belief that Merkle was treated 
harshly, the precedent that it sets will come back to haunt 
this court. Its conclusions with respect to probable cause 
and infringement of Merkle's liberty interests simply are not 
justified. 
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For the reasons that I state herein, I dissent from the 
majority opinion to the extent that it reverses. In all other 
respects I join its opinion. 
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